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q 201This paper addresses one of the most controversial issues in cultural anthropology: the conceptual foundations of
kinship and the apparent inevitability of ethnocentrism in kinship studies. The field of kinship studies has been in
turmoil over the past few decades, repeatedly pronounced dead and then again rising from the ashes and being
declared central to human affairs. As this paper argues, the conceptual confusion surrounding ‘kinship’ is to a large
extent due to the lack of a clear and rigorous methodology for discovering how speakers of the world’s different
languages actually navigate their kinship systems. Building on the author’s earlier work on kinship but taking the
analysis much further, this paper seeks to demonstrate that such a methodology can be found in natural semantic
metalanguage theory (developed by the author and colleagues), which relies on 65 universal semantic primes and on
a small number of universal “semantic molecules,” including ‘mother’ and ‘father’. The paper offers a new model for
the interpretation of kinship terminologies and opens new perspectives for the investigation of kinship systems
across languages and cultures.Introduction: ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ as a Conceptual
Basis for Kinship Studies
In the introduction to a recent volume titled Kinship Systems,
Patrick McConvell (2013a) writes, “kinship is one of the
foundations of human social life and, together with language,
is part of the change that made our hominid ancestors hu-
man” (1). In his view, a certain awareness of some “basic
family relationships” among apes is undeniable; “however, other
primates do not talk about classes of kinship relationships and
give them names, as all humans do—and did, for as far back as
we can know.”
So how do humans talk about “classes of kinship rela-
tionships”? McConvell answers this question as follows:
Kinship is the bedrock of all human societies that we know.
All humans recognize fathers and mothers, sons and
daughters, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, husbands
and wives, grandparents, cousins, and often many more
complex types of relationships in the terminologies that
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often kinship terms.
I fully agree that kinship is the bedrock of all human so-
cieties and that children’s first words are often words anal-
ogous to “mama” and “papa.” On the other hand, the claim
inherent in classical anthropology of kinship and made ex-
plicitly in the quote above—that all humans recognize not
only mothers and fathers but also sons and daughters,
brothers and sisters, and so on—is, in my view, unjustified.
As I will discuss more fully in this paper, evidence suggests
that all (or nearly all) human groups recognize mothers
and fathers (as well as wives and husbands) but not sons
and daughters or brothers and sisters. To put it differently,
‘mother’ and ‘father’ (in one sense of these words) are lexical
universals, whereas ‘son’ and ‘daughter’ or ‘brother’ and ‘sis-
ter’ are not.
For example, in most Australian languages there is no
general word for ‘brother’ that could be used regardless of
two children’s relative age (for a detailed discussion of
Pitjantjatjara, see Wierzbicka 2013a); and in many, there is
no general word for ‘son’ that could be used for both a
woman’s ‘son’ and a man’s ‘son’ (see Scheffler 1978). Thus,
judging by lexical evidence, it is simply not the case that all
humans (demonstrably) “recognize” brothers and sisters or
sons and daughters: it is speakers of English (and other Eu-
ropean languages) who do. Speakers of many Australian
languages do not; they recognize other relationships.Anna Wierzbicka is Professor of Linguistics (Emerita) at the School
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‘father’ (F) and ‘mother’ (M) are demonstrably primary and universal;
‘father’s child’ (F̅) and ‘mother’s child’ (M̅) are not. (Gould’s choice was
based on formal considerations, not on empirical research into many
different languages of the world.)
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anthropology because the meanings of these terms are the
most reliable guides to how speakers of a particular language
conceptualize their social relationships. Kinship is indeed one
of the fundamentals of human social life, but kinship only as
understood by members of a particular human group, not as
an abstract system conceived by outsiders and tied to those
outsiders’ conceptual vocabulary (derived from European lan-
guages). At the same time, if kinship categories of different
languages and cultures are to be explained to outsiders (and to
semioutsiders, in language revitalization programs), the ex-
planations have to be anchored in concepts that make sense to
insiders and outsiders alike, that is, in shared human concepts.
In his book Dying Words, in which he speaks of endan-
gered and dying languages of the world and discusses, inter
alia, the semantics of kinship in the endangered Australian
language Dalabon, linguist Nicholas Evans (2012) says, quite
poignantly, that once a language like Dalabon dies “no one’s
mind will again have the thought-paths that its ancestral
speakers once blazed” (159). But if so, it is all the more im-
portant to try to understand those thought-paths as best we
can, and it is an illusion to think that we can understand
them through academic English or algebraic modeling, no
matter how elegant such analyses can be (see Goddard and
Wierzbicka 2014a).
A huge amount of data on the world’s kinship terminol-
ogies has already been amassed, but if we are to move from
formal analyses of languages to understanding “the thought-
paths that [their] ancestral speakers once blazed,” a great deal
of interpretive semantic work will need to be undertaken.
Evans’s words echo Leibniz’s (1981 [1704]) famous statement
that “languages are the best mirror of the human mind”
(330). What is less famous is what Leibniz says in the next
breath: “and . . . a precise analysis of the significations of
words would tell us more than anything else about the op-
erations of the understanding.”
A precise analysis of the “significations of words” aimed
at discovering “the operations of the understanding [in a
given culture]” is one of the central tasks of cross-linguistic
semantics, which is clearly of vital importance to cultural
anthropology. There is a great deal to be discovered about
human thought-paths by reanalyzing the wealth of data col-
lected by anthropologists and linguists over many decades.
There is, of course, also a great deal to be discovered through
linguistic and anthropological fieldwork currently undertaken
in different parts of the world, including programs aimed
specifically at endangered languages. But much time and ef-
fort can also be wasted through data collection uninformed
by appropriate methodologies.
If the field of kinship studies has been in such a turmoil
over the last few decades—repeatedly pronounced “dead”
(see, e.g., Fogelson 2001) and then again rising from the ashes
and being declared central to human affairs (cf., e.g., Bamford
and Leach 2009; Carsten 2004; James 2008; Jones 2010b)—to
a large extent it has been so, I would argue, because of theThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
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tifiable conceptual anchor in this indispensable human field of
inquiry. In this paper, I will argue that such an anchor can be
found in universal (or near-universal) human concepts dis-
covered through decades of intralinguistic and cross-linguistic
research carried out in the natural semantic metalanguage
(NSM) framework (of which more shortly) and, in particular,
in the concepts ‘mother’ and ‘father’.
The key point is that, although this fact is often obscured
by language-specific patterns of polysemy, ‘mother’ and ‘fa-
ther’ are lexical universals, so these two words can be used as
two cornerstones for describing, interpreting, and comparing
kin terms in all languages and cultures. Of course ‘mother’
and ‘father’ have never been completely absent from an-
thropological thinking about kinship. More often than not,
however, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ have been mentioned in one
breath with ‘parents’ and ‘children’, and it has not been
clearly acknowledged that neither ‘parents’ nor ‘children’ (in
the sense of ‘offspring’) are lexical universals, as ‘mother’ and
‘father’ are—as demonstrated through wide-ranging cross-
linguistic investigations conducted by many scholars, over
many years, in the NSM framework to be discussed in the
next section.1
NSM: A Metalanguage for Describing Speakers’
Meanings across Languages and Cultures
The perspective on language, mind, and culture represented
by the NSM approach is summed up in the subtitle of my
1992 book Semantics, Culture and Cognition: Universal Hu-
man Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations. The inspi-
ration for this theory was Leibniz’s hypothesis about the
existence of an “alphabet of human thoughts”: a set of simple
concepts that are, as it were, “letters” of an innate mental
alphabet and elements into combinations of which all human
thoughts can be resolved (Wierzbicka 2011). Colleagues and I
believe that we have now essentially identified that set and
can present a close to final list of elementary and indis-
pensable human concepts that surface as words or word-like
elements in all languages. The English version of this set,
divided into 12 categories, is presented below (table 1).
Thus, 30-odd years of cross-linguistic (as well as intra-
linguistic) research have led NSM researchers to the con-
clusion that “inside” all languages we can find a small shared
lexicon (semantic primes) and a small shared grammar and
that together this panhuman lexicon and the panhuman
grammar linked with it form a minilanguage that can be seen1. Gould (2000:30) bases his algebraic analysis of kinship systems
four primary relations: F, M, F̅, M̅. In natural languages, however, o97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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abbreviation NSM is based on the English phrase “natural
semantic metalanguage.” This name reflects our conviction
that this minilanguage provides us with a neutral tool for de-
scribing the meanings embedded in the world’s languages.
The set of indefinables discovered through empirical cross-
linguistic investigations enables us to formulate reductive
paraphrases based directly on those indefinables, thus freeing
the interpretation of meanings (in any area and in any given
language) from explicit or implicit circularity.
For reasons of space, it is not possible to discuss here in
detail how the current set of semantic primes and the picture
of its inherent grammar have been arrived at in NSM work or
how its different aspects can be justified. (For extensive dis-
cussion, see Goddard 2011; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994,
2002, 2014b; NSM homepage 2014; Wierzbicka 1996).
The NSM table of universal semantic primes purports to
provide an answer to Leibniz’s quest for an alphabetum cog-
itationum humanarum, an “alphabet of human thoughts,”
which, he thought, could provide a common measure for com-
paring, articulating, and sharing ideas across languages and cul-
tures (see Wierzbicka 2011). It permits a standardized tran-
scription of meanings in a system independent of the language
and culture of the investigator andoffers a culture-independent
tool for the translation of meanings and ideas. Furthermore,
since this “international semantic alphabet” (so to speak) can be
accessed and used through a trimmed-down version of any nat-
ural language, it allows the meanings of cultural “others” to be
transcribed “in their own words,” without letting the investiga-
tor’s own language (e.g., English) come between the indigenous
meanings and the conceptual world of the investigator.
Conventional interlinear glosses formulated in English (or
whatever the language of the investigator happens to be) do
not provide a neutral framework for semantic “transcription,”
since more often than not they cannot be translated, with
exactly the same meaning, into other languages. By contrast,
the hallmark of NSM explications is their cross-translatability.
The metaphor of an alphabet, with its historical antecedent
in Leibniz’s thought, should not lead anyone to think thatThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
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the same time a universal grammar. It goes without saying
that meanings and ideas cannot be compared and explained
through isolated words: they can be compared and explained
only through sentences, that is, through words arranged into
meaningful sequences. No one understood this better than
Leibniz, who aimed at establishing a “lingua mentalis” rather
than just a mental lexicon. NSM, too, is a minilanguage: along
with a minilexicon of 65 universal primes (matching the em-
pirically established lexical common core of a large sample
of natural languages), it also includes a minigrammar (also
matching the empirically established grammatical common
core of a large sample of natural languages).
Taken together with their associated grammar, semantic
primes are believed to constitute the shared semantic-
syntactic core of all human languages. According to NSM
researchers, this shared core can be used as an analytical
metalanguage for the exploration of the full lexicons and
grammars of individual languages: it provides a nonarbitrary
standard tertium comparationis (common measure) that is
free from any English-specific terminological bias.
Needless to say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
I return to the question of the effectiveness of the NSM frame-
work in kinship studies in the last section of the paper.The Principle of Indigenization
Since the set of indefinables discovered through empirical
cross-linguistic investigations is, evidence suggests, shared by
all (or nearly all) languages, explications formulated in terms
of these indefinables can, in principle, be formulated in any
language, including that of the analyst’s indigenous consul-
tants. Accordingly, the principle of reductive paraphrase
(down to the indefinables) is logically linked with the prin-
ciple of indigenization formulated in my 1987 article “Kin-
ship Semantics: Lexical Universals as a Key to Psychological
Reality”:
The principle of indigenization can be formulated as fol-
lows . . . : If the semantic formulae are to constitute plausible
hypotheses about the native speakers’ meanings encoded in
language A (say Pitjantjatjara), then those formulae must be
translatable into language A. For example, it is permissible
to use in the semantic formulae English words such as per-
son, say, good, bad, mother, or father, if the language whose
meanings the analysis is trying to represent has words for
such concepts; and it is not permissible to use words such as
sex, generation, sibling, parallel, opposite, senior, or moiety,
if the language in question doesn’t have such words. (133)
Kronenfeld (1996:66) argues compellingly against the so-
called componential approach to kin terms, which defined
them all (including ‘mother’ and ‘father’) through abstract
and artificial features such as ‘lineality’, ‘ascending genera-
tion’, ‘one degree of generation removal’, and so on, pointing
out that “one infers lineality from fatherhood” (rather thanTable 1. Universal semantic primes (English exponents),
grouped into 12 related categories
1. I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, PEOPLE, BODY, KIND, PART
2. THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
3. ONE, TWO, MUCH~MANY, LITTLE~FEW, SOME, ALL
4. GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL
5. THINK, KNOW, WANT, DON’T WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
6. SAY, WORDS, TRUE
7. DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
8. BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING), MINE
9. LIVE, DIE
10. WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME
TIME, MOMENT
11. WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH
12. NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF, VERY, MORE, LIKE97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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with the evidence of “native usage.”
The argument that claims to psychological reality should
be consistent with the data on native usage is, to my mind,
unassailable (cf. Wierzbicka 1992:329–354). However, the pro-
viso “direct and implied” provides, I think, a loophole for con-
ceptual Eurocentrism and Anglocentrism, because what is seen
as implied may depend on the analyst’s assumptions that are
not shared by the native speakers. One might say that “implied
data” are not really data but more or less judicious interpre-
tations. Words shared by speakers in a given speech commu-
nity are “communicative currency” that is the best guide we
have to the “conceptual currency” on which this community’s
culture relies.
It is true that, as is often pointed out (see, e.g., Stasch 2013
and my response to Stasch in the same issue), the absence of a
word (e.g., ‘parent’, ‘son’, or ‘sibling’) does not prove the
absence of a concept in people’s minds, but it does prove its
absence from the conceptual currency used by people in their
daily communication. By contrast, the presence of a word (e.g.,
‘mother’) proves the presence of a certain conceptual coin
(‘mother’) in their normal communicative exchanges. Accord-
ingly, a “named” concept (e.g., ‘mother’) has a status in people’s
lives that a concept posited by scholars with a more or less
technical English word (e.g., parent or sibling) but not named
in a particular language cannot have.2
In his Available Light, Geertz (2000) wrote, “to say some-
thing about the forms of life of Hawaiians (or anybody else)
that Hawaiians do not themselves say opens one to the charge
that one is writing out other people’s consciousness for them,
scripting their souls” (102). To my mind, there is nothing in-
herently wrong with saying something about Hawaiians (or
anybody else) that they themselves do not say (cf. Wierzbicka
2013c). But to say something about Hawaiians (or anybody
else) that they could not themselves say (in their own words,
because they have no such words) indeed opens one to such a
charge.
An interpretation of Hawaiian kin terms that is based on
the concepts ‘mother’ and ‘father’ can be rendered in Ha-
waiian words, and so can the explications of kin terms from
Australian languages (Kayardild and Pitjantjatjara), which will
be presented in this paper. These explications do not simply
reproduce what the speakers of these languages themselves say
about these terms, but they do not include anything that they
could not themselves say (in their own words). Since all these
explications are couched in wordsmatching indigenous words,
they can also be discussed with bilingual consultants.2. As discussed in my Imprisoned in English (2014), arguments of this
kind usually exhibit a curious double standard. For example, nobody
claims that speakers of English have concepts such as ‘malanypa’ of ‘kuta’
named in Pitjantjatjara but not in English (to be discussed shortly), but
many claim that Pitjantjatjara speakers have a concept of ‘brother’, not
named in Pitjantjatjara but in English.
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Sciences, anthropologist Doug Jones (2010a) discusses “the
principle that we explain the natives’ use of language using
only translations of terms shared by the natives with every-
one else” and identifies it as the most distinctive feature of the
NSM-based approach to kinship (i.e., the approach that also
underlies the present paper). This is indeed fundamental and
distinctive, setting the NSM approach apart from all other
approaches. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is resisted.
But in an era when anthropology has come to be deeply
conscious of the need to move from talking exclusively about
other people (the “natives”) to consulting with those other
people, it is, I think, an idea whose time has come. At the very
least, the time has come to debate it.
The Pivotal Role Played by David Schneider’s
Critique of ‘Kinship’
Since many of the current controversies in kinship studies
take David Schneider’s (1984) attack on ‘kinship’ as their
central point of reference, I want to state clearly that, as I see
it, there was a great deal of truth in Schneider’s statements—
but also a great deal of error and confusion.
In his devastating critique of kinship studies, Schneider
argued that “kinship has been defined by European social
scientists, and European social scientists use their own folk
culture as the source of many, if not all of their ways of
formulating and understanding the world about them” (193).
This, I believe, is largely true (as I have argued myself in
Wierzbicka 1986, 1987, 1992, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b). Where, I
believe, Schneider went wrong was in applying this charge
also to ‘mother’ and ‘father’ (an error due to his failure to
recognize language-specific patterns of polysemy).
Schneider mocked the doctrine of the genealogical unity of
mankind, which assumes, as he wrote, that “mother is mother
the whole world over” and that “all mothers can be compared
by holding one element constant (that they bear children)”
(198). But, in fact, cross-linguistic semantic evidence shows
that this particular element is indeed constant—not only in
human experience but also in human conceptualization of
experience—and that by and large the same applies to ‘fa-
thers’ (cf. Shapiro 2009).
The birth of a large-brained human baby is a dramatic
event, even in modern conditions, let alone in premodern
ones—and for those present, there can be no mistake as to
whose body the baby’s body is emerging from. The relation
of the ‘father’ to a child rests, of course, on a much weaker
evidentiary basis, but as documented compellingly by Sarah
Hrdy (1981), among others, the idea of ‘paternity’ has played
an important part in human thinking throughout history,
reaching no doubt well into the evolutionary past. There is
also little doubt that in most, if not all, human cultures, there
are incest taboos relying on the concept of ‘father’, such as the
following ones (formulated in relation to the Pirahã people of
the Amazonia in Wierzbicka 2012; cf. Everett 2012):97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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a woman can’t be a man’s wife if he is her father
a woman can’t be a man’s wife if she is his mother
a woman can’t be a man’s wife if it is like this: her
mother is his mother, her father is his father
I will argue that a culture-neutral, nonethnocentric ex-
ploration of kinship terminology can be grounded in eight
kinship-related lexical universals (or near universals), six of
which appear in these three most basic incest taboos: ‘mother’,
‘father’, ‘birth’ [‘born’]; ‘wife’, ‘husband’; ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘child’.
Everything else is variable and reflects “local” cultures, not
universal human experience and thinking.3
The words for ‘mother’ and ‘father’ that we find in dif-
ferent languages may exhibit language-specific patterns of
polysemy, but evidence suggests that in every language one
of the meanings matches the body-based meanings of, roughly
speaking, ‘birth-giver’ and ‘begetter’. Schneider’s critique is
justified with respect to many other terms in kinship anthro-
pology’s traditional metalanguage, including ‘kin types’ such as
‘son’, ‘daughter’, ‘brother’, and ‘sister’ as well as ‘parent’, ‘child’
(as a converse of ‘parent’), and ‘sibling’. But putting ‘mother’
and ‘father’ on the same list amounts to throwing out the baby
with the bathwater.
In his recent article on Fanti kinship terminology, in a
section entitled “Kinship Terminologies as Semantic Sys-
tems,” David Kronenfeld (2012) writes,
Kinship terms . . . always have at least some referent for
which genealogical information is crucial. These genealog-
ical senses always provide a kind of fulcrum from which we
can work on the other aspects of the terms’ meanings—
whatever they may be. We always have this genealogical
aspect because people everywhere have mothers and (al-
most everywhere) fathers, who in turn have siblings. The
genealogy flows from these connections and the adaption of
some set of terms to the genealogy flows from the impor-
tance of mothers, fathers, and siblings. (154)
Well, yes and no: people everywhere have mothers and
(almost everywhere) fathers, and from an Anglo perspective
they may also have “siblings.” From their own perspective,
however, “people everywhere” have only mothers and (usu-
ally) fathers: unlike ‘mother’, ‘father’, and other people con-
nected to one another in various ways by reference to ‘mother’
and ‘father’. These connections can be conceptualized in dif-
ferent ways, one of which is the Anglo/English conceptual con-
struct ‘sibling’. In other words, the recognition of ‘mothers’ and
‘fathers’ is universal, but the recognition of ‘siblings’ (undiffer-
entiated in gender and relative age) is not (Wierzbicka 2013a,
forthcoming).
The editors of a recent volume on kinship analysis,
Thomas Trautmann and Peter Whiteley (2012), opened their
introduction to the volume with the observation that “an-
thropology began with kinship” and that “the anthropological3. For some possible exceptions, see Hua (1997).
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any comparative analysis requires a tertium comparationis.
If this tertium comparationis mixes universal (or almost-
universal) human concepts such as ‘mother’ and ‘father’ with
English concepts such as ‘parent’ and ‘sibling’, the resulting
comparative analysis is bound to have an Anglo/English slant
(Wierzbicka 2013a, 2014). Such a slant can be eliminated if
we restrict our common measure to common human con-
cepts. Cross-linguistic evidence shows that in the area of
kinship there are (apart from ‘wife’ and ‘husband’) only two
such concepts: ‘mother’ and ‘father’.“Multiplicity of Mothers”?
The emphasis on ‘mother’ and ‘father’ as the two foundational
ideas on which kinship systems are built—and as a conceptual
basis for kinship studies—is likely to provoke protests from
some scholars who take exception to the “genealogical frame-
work” in general and sometimes even denounce ‘motherhood’
as “the middle class ideal” and “a reflection of Western upper-
class concerns” (McKinnon 2005:112, 117; for discussion, see
Shapiro 2008). I believe that such an ideologically based re-
jection of the concepts of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ as the foun-
dation of kinship itself and a conceptual basis for kinship studies
is mistaken.
This has nothing to do with “individualism” or with a focus
on “the nuclear family.” Rather, my primary concern is with
the need to explicate concepts in a coherent and noncircular
manner. No matter how broad the class of women called by
the ‘mother’ word in a given language may be, it is simply not
possible to explicate any kinship-related concepts without a
direct or indirect reference to the strictly individual event of
birth. A phrase like “group motherhood” (McKinnon 2005)
reflects what I see as fuzzy thinking, never subjected to the
rigors of constructing coherent and noncircular definitions
and oblivious to the central place of polysemy in natural lan-
guage. (I will return to this point very shortly.)
One spurious argument that has sometimes been invoked
against ‘mother’ and ‘father’ as the mainstays of kinship sys-
tems concerns the individualistic outlook that these concepts
allegedly imply. For example, anthropologist Rupert Stasch
(2013) raises this argument against my account of some as-
pects of kinship semantics in the Australian language Da-
labon.
Australian Aboriginal people are certainly not individual-
istic, and yet as Margaret Kemarre Turner (an Aboriginal
woman and Arrernte speaker) explains in her book Iwenhe
Tyerrtye: What It Means to Be a Aboriginal Person (2010),
Aboriginal people’s strong sense of being part of a larger whole
is anchored precisely in the concepts ‘mother’ and ‘father’:
Aboriginal people don’t worry about themselves as one
people [person] on their own . . . we see that we’re not just
the one person. . . .We come from the spirit of our mother
and father, and that spirit, tyerrtye atherrame, has got a lot97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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4. ‘Be born [m]’, which is a foundational semantic molecule for
concepts of kinship, is also necessary for concepts involving “birth or-
der,” such as words for older and younger siblings. Like ‘mother’, ‘be
born’ needs to be explicated with reference to two bodies, a child’s body
and a woman’s body. Roughly speaking, first the child’s body is (for some
Wierzbicka Back to ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ 413of connection. We know that we’ve got two people in us, in
ourselves really. And from that two people, it’s just like a big
root of a tree comes out. That’s how we see it. (37)
Writing in English, Turner often uses the words mother
and father in the plural, too, but she clearly makes a dis-
tinction between ‘mother’ and ‘father’ in the singular (the
birth-giver and the begetter) and the extended meanings of
these words referring to certain social categories of people.
For example, she writes, “Kinship creates and inspires joyful
love for your mothers . . . , love and happiness for your
mother’s fathers . . . , for your father’s fathers, and abiding
love for the country” (84). She emphasizes “respecting your
mums and dads” (in the plural; 89), but she also talks about
“love for your mother, your father [in the singular], and your
children” (99), and she singles out in this context “our
mother and father, ratherre [the two of them], they’re the
ones now who brought the daylight for us” (99). So there is
no question of there being for Turner a “multiplicity of
mothers” indistinguishable from a person’s actual birth-giver.
The phrase “multiplicity of mothers” belongs to Susan
McKinnon (2005:110). If this phrase is to be taken literally,
then I would agree with Warren Shapiro (2008) that it makes
little sense. Shapiro uses as his crown argument against it the
methodological principle of “focality” or “prototypicality”: a
‘real mother’ (genetrix) is more focal or prototypical to the
category of ‘mother’ than any other woman to whom the
term for ‘mother’ can be extended in a given culture. This
principle, however, is not sufficient without a set of precise
definitions based on a rigorous semantic methodology. From a
semantic point of view, the decisive fact is that in a language in
which the word for ‘birth mother’ is also applied to some other
women, it is not possible to construct a workable unitary
definition of it covering its two (or more) different appli-
cations.
Generally speaking, to be able to establish what the mean-
ing of a given word is, one must first determine whether this
word is polysemous, and this requires some workable test for
polysemy. Such a test can be found in the principle that a
unitary meaning can be given a unitary definition and that
such a definition needs to be grounded in an independently
justified set of indefinables. Otherwise, all attempts at defin-
ing words would lead either to an infinite regress or to cir-
cularity (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014b; Wierzbicka 2011,
2012, 2015).
Many years of theoretical and empirical work within the
NSM framework have led researchers to the conclusion that
there are 65 or so indefinable words or word-like elements
(semantic primes) in all languages and that any other meanings
expressed in any language can be defined, directly or indirectly,
through the minilexicon of these 65 or so primes, combined in
accordance with a universal minigrammar.
In addition to universal semantic primes (“the alphabet of
human thoughts”), cross-linguistic research has identified a
few dozen universal “semantic molecules,” that is, wordsThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms afound in all (or nearly all) languages that, unlike primes, can
be further decomposed and that function as building blocks
within more complex meanings (Goddard 2012). For exam-
ple, words with meanings equivalent to ‘men’, ‘women’, and
‘children’, which can be found in all languages (cf. Goddard
and Wierzbicka 2014b), are not primes (they can be de-
composed), but they function in languages as integrated units
of meaning; the same applies to the words meaning ‘to be
born’.
To illustrate, the English word mother, in its basic meaning
of ‘birth-giver’ (from which all the other meanings of this
word are derived), can be explicated within the NSM frame-
work as follows:
someone’s mother
a woman
before this someone was born, this someone’s body
was for some time inside this woman’s body
While some readers may find this definition somewhat
baffling because of its unconventional form, its content is
hardly controversial and corresponds to facts known even to
young children: before a baby is born, it is for some time
inside a woman’s body, and this woman is this baby’s mother.
I call the meaning of ‘mother’ explicated above “basic”
because all the other meanings of this word can be explicated,
without circularity, through this one meaning, whereas this
meaning itself can be explicated via the simpler concepts
‘woman’, ‘child’, and ‘be born’. Avoiding circularity is the key
issue here: the meaning of mother as, roughly speaking,
‘birth-giver’ is recognized as basic because this is the only way
to build a coherent and noncircular overall account. (Dic-
tionary definitions such as “mother is a female parent” and
“parent is a mother or father” are notorious.)
The words woman and be born, which are included in the
NSM-based definition, are universally attested but are not
indefinable. The words child and woman (and also man) have
been explicated in terms of the 65 primes in Words and
Meanings (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014b, chap. 2), and be
born can be explicated via woman and child. The explication
of ‘child’ is framed exclusively in terms of semantic primes;
that of ‘woman’, in terms of primes and one independently
explicated semantic molecule (‘child’); and that of ‘born’, in
terms of primes and two independently explicated molecules
(‘child’ and ‘woman’). However, the concept of ‘mother’ relies
on primes and three independently explicated molecules
(‘child’, ‘woman’, and ‘born’) while at the same time also
referring to a period of pregnancy, when the child’s body is
inside the woman’s body (see table 2).4 There is no room here97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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the key point is that the definitions of woman and child de-
veloped in Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014b) do not include
any references to being born, so there is no circularity: di-
rectly or indirectly, all the definitions in question are based
on the indefinables.
Many molecules are language and culture specific; for ex-
ample, ‘read’, ‘write’, ‘God’, ‘number’ and ‘money’ are im-
portant semantic molecules of English that function as ready-
made units in the meaning of many other English words,
but they are of course far from universal. On the other hand,
NSM-based cross-linguistic research suggests that ‘man’,
‘woman’, and ‘child’ can be found as words (or distinct
meanings of polysemous words) in all (or nearly all) lan-
guages, as can ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘wife’, ‘husband’, and ‘be
born’. Evidence suggests that these concepts are important
building blocks in the edifice of kinship terminologies across
languages and cultures.
The paraphrase of the primary meaning of mother pre-
sented here is similar to—and yet different from—Ian Keen’s
(1985) “vernacular definition” phrased as “one’s mother istime) inside a woman’s body, then something happens to the woman’s
body, and after this, the child’s body is no longer inside the woman’s
body but “out.” The scenario of ‘birth’—played out in time and space—
can be explicated more precisely with a template similar to that used for
dozens of words of ‘doing’ and ‘happening’ in Goddard and Wierzbicka
(forthcoming), as in table 2.
The first part of the template, called the “lexicosyntactic frame,”
presents ‘being born’ as something that happens to someone in a certain
place at a certain time (the unique “coordinates” of birth: where and
when someone was born). To explain what happened, it is necessary to
set the scene with the presence of a woman (the mother) who is “with
child,” i.e., having inside her body ‘the living body of a child’. The
woman’s body then undergoes a “process” (‘something happens to her
body for some time’), which leads to the “outcome” that this child’s body
is no longer inside the mother’s body but is ‘somewhere near her body’.
The explication is capped off with a component identifying the child in
question as ‘someone X’, i.e., the referent of the grammatical subject of
the sentence.
This content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athe female person who gave birth to one” (66; cf. my own
definition in Wierzbicka [1972:46], to which Keen refers).
The main difference lies in the metalanguage of the semantic
description: Keen’s definition could not be translated into
most languages of the world because they do not have a word
meaning ‘female’ (although they do have one meaning ‘woman’)
or a relative clause (“person who”), whereas evidence suggests
that the NSM-based explication presented here can be ren-
dered, word for word, in any language.
The concept of ‘father’—which, along with ‘mother’, serves
as a fundamental reference point for most, if not all, of the
world’s kinship systems—can be portrayed in simple and
cross-translatable words as follows:
someone’s father
a man
some time before this someone was born5. Rep
frequently
on closer
97.058 on
nd Condits man did something with a part of the body to a
man’s body
thing happened inside this woman’s body because
this
time after this this someone was born because of
sIn the anthropological literature on kinship it is sometimes
affirmed that ‘father’ is socially constructed and therefore not
universal (even if ‘mother’ is), and Malinowski’s assertions
(1913, 1922) concerning the Australian Aborigines’ and the
Trobrianders’ supposed ignorance of physiological paternity
are far better known to many anthropologists than their
rebuttals (see, e.g., Pulman 2004).
Statements to the effect that in many societies ‘father’ is
socially constructed are often vague, and yet they are some-
times automatically taken as evidence that in these societies
the notion of ‘begetting’ is unknown. This applies in partic-
ular to polyandric societies. As an antidote against such su-
perficial thinking, it is worth quoting here Nancy Levine’s
(1987) exemplary study of ‘fathers’ and ‘sons’ in Tibetan
polyandry, where brothers share wives but nonetheless,
A clear distinction is drawn between paternity in the sense
of engendering a child and in the sense of ‘giving’, literally
‘binding’ a child in one’s name (ming tag tag pa). (271)
It may seem a dubious venture to try to assign paternity
where a woman has several husbands. Most polyandriously
married women, however, have no more than two, and the
men are not always home at the same time. . . . Thus it is
wives who control assignments of paternity, here and in the
other communities. . . . Later when the child is old enough
to understand, they tell him who his or her ‘real’ (ngothog)
father is. . . . Real fathers and children are aware of one
another’s identities. (274)5Table 2. TemplateSomeone X (e.g., John) was born at this timeething happened to this someone X at this
time it happened in a placeLexicosyntactic
frameBefore it happened, it was like this:
—there was a woman [m] in this place
at that time
—inside her body there was the living body
of a child [m]Prior scenarioAfter this, something happened to this woman’s
[m] body for some timeProcessBecause of this, after this, the body of this child
[m] was not inside her body anymore, it was
somewhere near her body
this child [m] was someone XOutcomeorts on languages that supposedly lack a word for ‘father’
surface in academic as well as popular publications. Usually,
inspection they prove to be spurious. For example, in a recent
 September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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Wierzbicka Back to ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ 415The idea that the words for ‘mother’ and ‘father’ have a
primary meaning (based, roughly speaking, on the events of
birth and conception) and extended meanings is not new
(cf., e.g., Gould 2000; Kronenfeld 1996; Scheffler 1978). What
is new is, first, the insistence that of all the kin types distin-
guished in English and used in the traditional anthropology
of kinship (such as M, F, B, Z, S, and D), only the first two,
‘mother’ and ‘father’, provide stable universal reference points;
and second, a rigorous methodology for establishing howmany
meanings a given word (whether kin term or not) has, and
what they are. This methodology, which has been tested in
hundreds of studies across many domains, languages, and cul-
tures (see NSM homepage 2014), is not based on componential
analysis (relying on artificial symbols of one kind or another; for
discussion, see, e.g., D’Andrade 1995) but on reductive para-
phrases formulated in natural languages and constrained by a
controlled vocabulary of indefinables (words or word-like el-
ements) that have been established through many years of em-
pirical cross-linguistic investigations.
To sum up, Schneider was right to suggest that most earlier
approaches to kinship were ethnocentric, but he was wrong
to claim that there was no such thing as kinship that could be
validly identified across languages and cultures. By recog-
nizing ‘mother’ and ‘father’ as shared human concepts we can
partially validate Schneider while at the same time going, in a
constructive way, beyond Schneider.
A New Model for Analyzing Kinship Terminologies:
The Ordinary Language Model
The key idea of the approach to kinship presented here is that
all kin terms in all languages build on the concepts ‘mother’
and ‘father’ and that all kinship terminologies, no matter how
divergent, can be compared and explained through these two
fundamental concepts. As already mentioned, these two con-
cepts are not semantic primes: they are semantic molecules,
apparently lexicalized in all languages with exactly the same
meaning. It is true that in many languages (e.g., in Pitjantjat-
jara, to be discussed shortly) the word for ‘mother’ (in
Pitjantjatjara), ngunytju, can be applied not only to a person’sntry on Language Log titled “The Ethnic Group in China That Doesn’t
ave a Word for Father” (October 13, 2014), Victor Mair comments: “Even
a matriarchy, if there are children, someone has to sire them, and it is
kely that there would be a word for such an important person.” In this
ontext, Mair quotes anthropologist Tami Blumenfield, who speaks the
nguage of the Mosuo, Naru, and who refers to Mattison, Scelza, and
lumenfield (2014): “It’s ‘ada’. There is some village-to-village variation and
me people will just use the term for uncle, which can refer to all men of
e father’s generation (or the mother’s, for that matter). I’m sending a link
an article I co-authored with Siobhan Mattison and Brooke Scelza on
aternal investment in Na communities. I am working on an article called
e Have Fathers and We KnowWho They Are!’ So in a word—all those
ebsite articles are not too accurate, and they repeat the inaccuracies so
ey spread and expand.”e
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a‘birth-giver’ but also to many other women. But words like
ngunytju can be shown, on language-internal grounds, to be
polysemous.
For example, the phrase mama ngunytju, literally ‘mother
father’, is used only about a person’s biological mother and
father (Goddard 1996:67), and only one’s biological mother
and father can be specified as ngunytju mulapa ‘true mother’
and mama mulapa ‘true father’ (Goddard 1986:153). It is also
worth noting comments made by native speakers of Aus-
tralian languages, such as those cited in Henderson and
Dobson’s (1994) dictionary of Central and Eastern Arrernte
in the entry for the word meye:
meye n.
1a. mother. Meye atyinhe ayenge-arle atnerte interleke re
meye atyinhe anthurre. My real mother is the mother whose
stomach I was in.
1b.mother’s sister; aunt. Meye atyinhe, meye atyinhe-kenhe
yaye re meye atyinhe antime. My mother and my mother’s
sisters are all my mother too.
Leaving aside polysemous uses of meye in relation to a
man’s daughter-in-law and to a mother’s brother, the dic-
tionary also notes an extended use of meye, glossed as “other
women of about the right age and the same skin name as
your mother.” Thus, one meaning of ngunytju and meye
matches the universal sense of, roughly speaking, the birth-
giver, and the others are extended; as we will see shortly, the
same applies to the words for ‘father’ in both Pitjantjatjara
and Arrernte.
For the moment, I will show how the universal semantic
molecules ‘mother’ and ‘father’ allow us to overcome the
Eurocentrism of the classic approach by analyzing, through
‘mother’ and ‘father’ and without ‘brother’ and ‘sister’, the
Pitjantjatjara kin terms kamuru and kuntili (in their primary
senses, not extended ones).
[A] kamuru1 (“MB”)
someone can say about a man “this is my kamuru” if
this someone can think about this man like this:
“his mother is my mother’s mother, his father is my
mother’s father”
[B] kuntili1 (“FZ”)
someone can say about a woman “this is my kuntili” if
this someone can think about this woman like this:
“her father is my father’s father, her mother is my
father’s mother”
As these explications show, the terms kamuru (“maternal
uncle”) and kuntili (“paternal aunt”) are construed via the
level of grandparents. Thus, one’s kamuru is not conceptu-
alized as a brother of one’s mother but as a man who shares
his parents (mother and father) with one’s mother. Similarly,
one’s kuntili is not conceptualized as a sister of one’s father
but as a woman who shares her parents (mother and father)
with one’s father. (I will return to this point later.)97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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explicate below the Pitjantjatjara words kuta (“older brother”)
and malanypa (“younger sibling”), noting that the molecules
‘mother’ and ‘father’ allow us to get rid of two major flaws of
the traditional approach (in addition to its inherent Eurocen-
trism): its conceptual redundancy and its failure to sufficiently
account for the entailments. For example, in analyzing the
termsmalanypa as “Sb2” (‘younger sibling’) and kuta as “B1”
(‘older brother’), the traditional approach used both “brother”
and “sibling”, whereas clearly one of them should have suf-
ficed. At the same time, this approach failed to recognize the
fact that if one man is another’s kuta, then the other man is the
first one’smalanypa. Both of these weaknesses are overcome in
the two explications below:
[C] kuta (“B+”)
someone can say about a man “this is my kuta” if this
someone can think about this man like this:
“his mother is my mother, his father is my father, he
was born before I was born”
someone can say the same about a child if after
some time, this child can be a man
[D] malanypa1 (“Sb−”)
someone can say about a child “this is my malanypa” if
this someone can think about this child like this:
“this child’s mother is my mother, this child’s father
is my father, this child was born after I was born”
someone can say the same about someone else
when this other someone is not a child anymore
I would like to draw attention to two aspects of these ex-
plications. First, the frame is “someone can say this if it is like
this” and not “someone can say this only if it is like this,” that
is, it does not preclude other uses. This is consistent with the
classificatory uses of such forms, which will be discussed
later. Second, these explications reflect differences in the pro-
totypical perspective associated with different kin terms. Thus,
kamuru (‘mother’s brother’) and kuntili (‘father’s sister’) pre-
sent relationships that refer, prototypically, to an adult kamuru
(“a man”) and an adult kuntili (“a woman”), although these
adult prototypes can be extended to children; and the same
applies to kuta. By contrast, malanypa refers, prototypically
(though by no means exclusively), to a “younger sibling” who
is a child. The reason is that the relationship itself is initially
with a child: apart from a firstborn, the moment a child is born
it is someone else’s malanypa. This is not the case, of course,
with kuta.
The basic assumptions underlying this analysis are con-
sistent with the general conclusions reached by Scheffler
(1978) in his classic Australian Kin Classification and can be
summed up as follows:
1. “The categories by which the aboriginal people of Aus-
tralia order their social lives are predominantly kin cate-
gories” (ix);This content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a2. “The evidence is quite clear that the so-called terms of
relationship designate egocentric, genealogically defined
categories, and are polysemous; each term has a struc-
turally primary and specific sense and a derivative, ex-
panded, or broader sense (or senses)” (66); and
3. “The ‘kinship terms and extensions’ interpretation of the
meanings of Aranda and other Australian ‘terms of rela-
tionship’ is the correct interpretation” (21).
Yet while the basic assumptions of the NSM-based model
developed here are consistent with Scheffler’s, the explica-
tions of kin terms presented here look quite different from his
and, indeed, from any definitions of such terms offered in the
anthropological literature. The main features of this newmodel,
which I will call “the ordinary-language model of kinship ter-
minologies,” can be summed up as follows:
1. This model is grounded in the lexical universals ‘mother’
and ‘father’.
2. This model does not use any kin terms (e.g., ‘parent’,
‘sibling’) other than those two lexical universals.
3. The explications based on this model are cross-translatable
into the language that is being described (Pitjantjatjara,
Kayardild, or whatever).
4. The model is transparently relational, as the basic frames
used are “someone is someone else’s so-and-so” and “some-
one can say about someone else: . . . ‘this is my so-and-so’.”
5. The model is transparently egocentric, as what one person
can say about another is phrased in terms of the first person
pronoun “my”: “this is my . . .”
6. The model is based on rules: “someone can say . . . if . . .”
(although not rules of the form “if and only if”).
7. These rules are formulated in words matching indigenous
words and phrases, and they are consistent with what is
known about the way that knowledge about the use of kin
terms is actually transmitted (see, e.g., Laughren 1984;
Nicholls 2009).
8. The model allows us to capture differences in prototypical
age-related perspective that were never captured in the tra-
ditional approach.
9. The model frees the analyst from the need to supplement
the description of kin types with extraneous metacom-
ments, such as “for a male ego” and “for a female ego,” and
allows for a unitary definition for each meaning.
No Need for “Male Ego” and “Female Ego”:
“Siblings” in Kayardild
Number 9 in the numbered set above is so important that I
will discuss it more fully with reference to a set of examples:
the “sibling terms” from the Australian language Kayardild
(cf. Wierzbicka 2013a, 2014).
Evans (1995:553) offers two diagrams for Kayardild sibling
terms, one for “male ego” and one for “female ego” (fig. 1). If
one studies these diagrams closely, one can see that they in-97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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Wierzbicka Back to ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ 417volve a lot of redundancy and at the same time include the
technical analytical construct “ego.” To show how we can
simplify this analysis and at the same time bring it closer to
the insider perspective, I will start with the word wakatha,
which appears only in the diagram for “male ego” and which
is assigned two symbols: “EZ” (“elder sister”) and “YZ”
(“younger sister”). Since Kayardild evidently does not have a
word for “sister” (in general), this diagram could not be
reproduced in Kayardild itself. This does not apply to the
explication below.
[E] wakatha
a m
“
a c
o
“
aan can say about a woman “this is my wakatha” if
he can think about her like this:
her mother is my mother, her father is my father”Turning now to kularrinda, whose gloss phrased in semi-
technical English can be very short, simple English matching
Kayardild words, this term can be explicated as follows (for
further discussion, see Wierzbicka 2013a):
[F] kularrinda (“opposite sex sibling”)
hild can say about another child “this is my
kularrinda” if it is like this:
ne of these children can think about the other one
like this:
this someone’s mother is my mother, this
someone’s father is my father”
fter some time, one of these children can be a man,
the other can be a womanThe same model of description that allows us to dispense
with terms like “ego,” “opposite sex,” and “sibling” in the
case of wakatha and kularrinda allows us also to dispenseThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms awith them in describing the meanings of the other Kay-
ardild “sibling terms,” that is, thabuju, duujinda, and ya-
kukathu:
[G] thabuju (“older sibling, same sex, male ego”)97
nda man can say about another man “this is my thabuju”
if he can think about him like this:
“his mother is my mother, his father is my father, he
was born before I was born”
a child can say the same about another child if after
some time both these children can be men
[H]yakukathu (“older sibling, samesex, female ego”)
a woman can say about another woman “this is my
yakukathu” if she can think about her like this:
“her mother is my mother, her father is my father, she
was born before I was born”
a child can say the same about another child if after
some time both these children can be women
[I] duujinda (“younger sibling of same sex”)
a woman can say about another woman “this is my
duujinda” if she can think about her like this:
“her mother is my mother, her father is my father, she
was born after I was born”
a child can say the same about another child if after
some time both these children can be women
a man can say about another man “this is my
duujinda” if he can think about him like this:
“his mother is my mother, his father is my father, he
was born after I was born”
a child can say the same about another child if after
some time both these children can be menFigure 1. Kayardild sibling terms (male and female ego)..058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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here, we can reinterpret kinship systems of Australian lan-
guages (such as Pitjantjatjara and Kayardild) not only with-
out ‘brother’, ‘sister’, and ‘sibling’ but also without ‘sex’, ‘male’,
‘female’, and, last but not least, ‘ego’—and in words with
counterparts in these languages themselves.
In their classic study “The Meaning of Kinship Terms,”
Wallace and Atkins (1960) commented that in kinship
studies “the degree of psychological reality achieved in eth-
nographic reporting is not only uneven but on the average
probably rather low” (79) and concluded that “a problem for
research . . . must be to develop techniques for stating and
identifying those definitions which are most proximate to
psychological reality” (78). This paper seeks to develop such
techniques.
More than a decade has passed since D’Andrade (2001)
remarked that the NSM “offers a potential means to ground
all complex concepts in ordinary language and translate
concepts from one language to another without loss or dis-
tortion of meaning” (246). It seems to me that the trans-
lations of the Kayardild “sibling terms” into NSM English
proposed here are a good illustration of D’Andrade’s point.Extended Meanings of ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’
in Pitjantjatjara
In his Australian Kin Classification (1978), Scheffler argues
persuasively that for Australian languages “the ‘kinship terms
and extensions’ interpretation . . . is the correct interpreta-
tion” (21). Accordingly, on Scheffler’s analysis, in the case of
the Pitjantjatjara words ngunytju “M” and mama “F” the
primary meanings are ‘mother’ and ‘father’, and any other
senses of these words must be seen as extensions. From a
semantic point of view, this is evidently right: if (my)
ngunytju can be defined as, roughly, “the woman who gave
birth to me,” then it is clear that when this word is used with
reference to women other than the birth-givers, some other
meaning or meanings must be involved. But how many, ex-
actly?
The answer that I want to argue for is that, in addition to
‘birth-giver’, ngunytju has two other meanings and that it is
one of these two extended meanings rather than the primary
meaning of ‘birth-giver’ that provides a prototype for the
wide range of women going beyond the narrow circle of the
birth-giver’s actual sisters. In saying this, I am following in
the footsteps of Malinowski, who in his book The Sexual Life
of Savages (1929) wrote (in relation to the Trobriand system):
The mixing up of the individual and the “classificatory”
relations, kept apart by the natives in law, custom, and idea,
has been a most misleading and dangerous cause of error in
anthropology. . . . Carrying the genealogy beyond the family
circle, we can see that . . . the first person from the larger
world to enter into the circle of kinsmen is the mother’s
sister, who, although she is called by the same term as theThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aown mother, inagu, is very definitely distinguished from
her. The word inagu extended to the mother’s sister is, from
the outset, given an entirely different meaning—something
like “second mother” or “subsidiary mother.” (525)
It is noteworthy that Malinowski refers here to linguistic as
well as ethnographic evidence:
In its second sense inagu is used with a different feeling-
tone; and there are circumlocutions, grammatic usages, and
lexicographical indices which differentiate the secondary
from the primary meaning. Only to a linguistically un-
trained European observer, especially if he is not conversant
with the native language, can the word inagu (2) (mother’s
sister) appear identical with inagu (1) (own mother). On
this point any intelligent native, if properly questioned,
could correct the ethnographer’s error. (525)
Evidence suggests that the same applies to Pitjantjatjara.
Just as the ‘mother’s brother’ (in Pitjantjatjara, kamuru) is the
focal point for a broad class of ‘classificatory mother’s broth-
ers’ (as it is usually called in Australian studies), so ‘mother’s
sister’ (in Pitjantjatjara, ngunytju) is the focal point for a broad
class of ‘classificatory mother’s sisters’. That the word for
‘mother’s sister’ (ngunytju) is the same as that for ‘mother’
(birth-giver), significant as it is, can easily obscure the paral-
lelism between the two cases.
Discussions of “focal” and “extended” meanings of the
word for ‘mother’ in different languages often rely on the
word ‘like’ as the key to the extension. Indeed, it has often
been reported in ethnographic literature that a word or suffix
meaning ‘like’ is used by native-speaker consultants (cf., e.g.,
Shapiro 2009:35). Such reports are very valuable. Nonethe-
less, we must tread carefully here. If the basic meaning of a
word like inagu ‘my mother’ (cited by Malinowski) is “the
woman who gave birth to me,” then there can hardly be, from
the native speaker’s point of view, a great many other women
related to me like my inagu is: the birth is a unique event and
the birth-giver is in a unique relationship to the born. The
mother’s sister is not in a unique relationship to me: she did
not give birth to me, and there can be several mother’s sisters.
At the same time, my mother’s sisters are all ‘like my mother’
in so far as they have the same mother and father as my
mother. This places them in a special halfway position be-
tween the “true mother” and the large class of women whom
I can be expected to address and to refer to by the same word.
Thus, the small class of my mother’s sisters (anchored in the
persons of my maternal grandparents) can be seen as a pro-
totype for the large class of ‘classificatory mother’s sisters’:
I can think of my mother’s sisters as being like my “true”
mother in some respects, and I can think of my ‘classificatory
mother’s sisters’ as being, in some respects, like my “true” moth-
er’s sisters.
Shapiro (2009) says that “in universal system of kin cate-
gorization parents probably always provide the focal points
for the wider application of kin terms” (34). Strictly speaking,97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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reference points for kin terms rather than “focal points”
(prototypes) for ‘classificatory’ mothers and fathers.
Accordingly, I will posit for the Pitjantjatjara word for
‘mother’ three distinct meanings rather than two: ngunytju0
(mother, that is, birth-giver), ngunytju1 (‘mother’s sister’),
and ngunytju2 (‘classificatory mother’s sister’). I use the
symbol zero for the birth-giver (and also for the begetter) to
signal their unique and foundational character as well as to
highlight the conceptual parallelism between ngunytju1
(‘mother’s sister’) and kamuru1 (‘mother’s brother’) and that
between mama1 (‘father’s brother’) and kuntili1 (‘father’s
sister’). This leads us to the following three explications that
distinguish between three situations in which the word
ngunytju can be used:
1. ngunytju0 (‘mother’, i.e., ‘birth-giver’, as defined
earlier)
2.
so
“
be
3.
so
“
a
2.
so
“
b
3.
so
“
a
so
“
ku
songunytju1 (‘mother’s sister’)
meone can say about a woman ‘this is my ngunytju’
if this someone can think about her like this:
her mother is my mother’s mother, her father is my
mother’s father
cause of this, this is someone like my mother”
ngunytju2
meone can say about a woman “this is my ngunytju”
if this someone can think about her like this:
this is not one of my ngunytju-s
t the same time, this is someone like my ngunytju-s”“
aAt first glance, these three explications may seem to con-
tradict each other, as each of them specifies different condi-
tions under which the word ngunytju can be used about a
woman (or to a woman). In fact, however, they are fully
compatible: since none of the three explications says that the
word ngunytju can be used “if and only if (such and such),”
they jointly present three different sets of circumstances
under which this word can be used—and this fits the facts.
What applies to ngunytju ‘mother’ applies also to mama
‘father’.
1.mama0 (‘father’, i.e., ‘begetter’, as defined earlier)
mama1 (‘father’s brother’)
meone can say about a man “this is my mama” if this
someone can think about him like this:
his father is my father’s father, his mother is my
father’s mother
ecause of this, this is someone like my father”
mama2 (‘classificatory father’s brother’)
meone can say about a man “this is my mama” if this
someone can think about him like this:
this is not one of my mama-s
t the same time, this is someone like my mama-s”Treating the meanings ngunytju1 (‘mother’s sister’) and
mama1 (‘father’s brother’) as the prototypes for the broader
classificatory categories allows us to present ‘mother’s sister’This content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aand ‘mother’s brother’ as well as ‘father’s sister’ and ‘father’s
brother’ as partly (although not entirely) parallel in both their
meanings, the ‘focal’ one and the ‘classificatory’ one, as the
following explications of kamuru1 and kamuru2 (parallel to
those of ngunytju1 and ngunytju2 above) illustrate:
kamuru1 (‘mother’s brother’)97.05
nd Comeone can say about a man “this is my kamuru” if
this someone can think about him like this:
his mother is my mother’s mother, his father is my
mother’s father”
muru2 (‘classificatory mother’s brother’)
meone can say about a man “this is my kamuru” if
this someone can think about him like this:
this is not one of my kamuru-s
t the same time, this is someone like my kamuru-s”Similarly, the two explications of kuntili1 (‘father’s sister’)
and kuntili2 (‘father’s classificatory sister’) can be parallel—
up to a point—to the explications ofmama1 (‘father’s brother’)
and mama2 (‘classificatory father’s brother’):
kuntili1 (‘father’s sister’)
meone can say about a woman “this is my kuntili ” if
this someone can think about her like this:
her father is my father’s father, her mother is my
father’s mother”
ntili2 (‘classificatory father’s sister’)
meone can say about a woman “this is my kuntili ” if
this someone can think about her like this:
this is not one of my kuntili-s
t the same time, this is someone like my kuntili-s”Needless to say, it is not an accident that the word for
“mother” and “mother’s sister” in Pitjantjatjara are the same
(ngunytju), whereas the word for “mother’s brother” (kamuru)
is different (or that the words for “father” and for “father’s
brother” are the same [mama], whereas the word for “father’s
sister” [kuntili] is different). In both cases, the formal identity
of the words for “same-sex siblings” sends a powerful cultural
message (cf. Goddard 1986).
In the case of ngunytju (“M”) and mama (“F”), the key
cultural message sent by the terminology is that I can think
about my mother’s sisters like I can think about my mother
and that I can think about my father’s brothers like I can
think about my father. Thus, while ngunjtju (‘mother’s sis-
ter’) and kumura (‘mother’s brother’) are semantically par-
allel, up to a point, there is also a difference between the two:
only the first of them includes the component “this is some-
one like my mother.” Similarly, whilemama (‘father’s brother’)
and kuntili (‘father’s sister’) are semantically parallel, up to a
point, only the first of them includes the component “this is
someone like my father.”
By sorting out the different meanings of words such as
ngunytju and mama we can bring to light the fact that
languages such as Pitjantjatjara have a special conceptual
category of women who, roughly speaking, share the same8 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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who share the same father and mother. At the same time, we
can help identify a key conceptual difference between ‘uncles’
and ‘aunts’ in European languages and their counterparts in
Australian languages. For example, in English one’s “uncles”
and “aunts” are conceptualized, above all, as brothers and
sisters of one’s mother and father, whereas in Pitjantjatjara
kamuru-s and kuntili-s appear to be conceptualized, above all,
as men and women who share their mothers and fathers with
one’s own mother and father, that is, through the level of
‘grandparents’ (Goddard 1986).
Explications and Cultural Scripts
The “classificatory” meanings of ngunytju, kamuru, mama,
and kuntili can be seen as, above all, licensed ways of
addressing a wide range of people who are not close relatives as
if they were close relatives. This fits in with the cultural im-
portance of addressing people by a relationship term—and of
choosing the right relationship term in a given interpersonal
situation. This does not exclude, of course, the use of these
terms in reference to people, but it highlights their use as ap-
propriate terms of address.
The “classificatory” meanings of ngunytju, kamuru, mama,
and kuntilli as portrayed here do not predict who can or
should be addressed by each of these terms, but each of them
offers, as it were, a foothold for a cultural rule that will specify
that. In NSM research, such rules—referred to as cultural
scripts—are specified in the same metalanguage as the ex-
plications and are subject to the same requirements of in-
telligibility, cross-translatability, and verifiability in consul-
tation with native speakers (see, e.g., Goddard 2010; Goddard
and Wierzbicka 2004; Wierzbicka 2010a).
The cultural scripts relevant in the present context are
based on the cultural premise that it is good to address other
people by a kin term—that is, a term that recognizes their
place in the local social space and indicates how the speaker is
thinking about them. At the same time, they tell people with
what word (what kin term) they can convey this desirable
message to a particular person to whom they want to speak at
a given moment. Roughly, such scripts can be formulated as
follows:
[A] if a woman can call my mother’s mother ngunytju
I can call this woman ngunytju
[B] if a man can call my mother’s mother ngunytju
I can call this man kamuru
[C] if a man can call my father’s father mama
I can call this man mama
[D] if a woman can call my father’s father mama
I can call this woman kuntilli
(This is, of course, only a very small subset of “cultural
scripts” relating to kin terms in Aboriginal Australia; see, e.g.,
Nicholls 2009, 2013; Sutton 1982; for further discussion, see
Wierzbicka 2016.) Thus, cultural scripts can work in tandemThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms awith explications to transmit cultural knowledge about the
local principles of human interaction. For example, if I know
that a man’s mother is my mother’s mother, I know then that
I can address this man as “kamuru” (as the explication of
kamuru1 suggests). At the same time, I know that I can ad-
dress many other men as “kamuru” (the explication of ka-
muru2 foreshadows that), and the cultural script [C] tells me
that I can call any man with this word if I know that this
man calls my mother’s mother “ngunytju.”
In his 1980 article “Particularistic or Universalistic Anal-
yses of Fanti Kin-Terminology,” Kronenfeld presents the two
goals—cross-cultural comparison of kinship terminologies
and language users’ likely “cognitive operations”—as equally
worthwhile but difficult, if not impossible, to achieve at the
same time, and he suggests that “we should turn to alterna-
tive analyses for different goals.” As this paper illustrates,
however, when we use the NSM-based model of kinship
analysis—the ordinary-language model—we can achieve both
of these goals at the same time. A key role in this model is
played by eight semantic molecules: ‘mother’, ‘father’; ‘wife’,
‘husband’; ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘child’; and ‘be born’.
In his recent article “Kinship as Classification,” Parkin
(2012) notes that “many anthropologists, after all, have
openly marvelled at the ability of certain ethnic groups in
places like Australia to devise complicated systems of cross-
cousin marriage that they (the anthropologists) have great
difficulty in grasping” (206). It seems clear that in order to
understand how the speech communities in Australia learn
and use their kinship terminologies, it is desirable for the
analyst to be able to speak about it to native consultants. Such
conversations can hardly rely on the language of algebra or
the technical language of anthropology. They can, however,
draw on the “ordinary-language” resources of NSM. The
empirically discovered universal semantic primes—and, in
particular, the eight universal semantic molecules on which
kinship terminologies are built—help us to overcome the
Anglocentrism and Eurocentrism in the area of kinship stud-
ies and to bring to light aspects of social organization and
social cognition without using arcane algebraic or other tech-
nical apparatus and without, in Geertz’s (2000) words, “writ-
ing out other people’s conscientiousness for them, scripting
their souls” (102).
Concluding Remarks: NSM and Kinship Studies
In a recent article “Culture and Kinship Language,” anthro-
pologist David Kronenfeld (2015) discusses the history of the
studies of kinship terminologies and singles out “two major
approaches [that] have been developed providing a more
efficient and insightful rigorous formal representation of kin-
types” (163). Kronenfeld illustrates the working of these two
approaches with two analyses of the Fanti word wofa, glossed
in English as ‘maternal uncle’, and its “reciprocal,” awofasi.
In the first approach, Kronenfeld notes, “wofa, the Fanti
maternal uncle term, would be MB, while awofasi, its recip-97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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male, Z for sister, and C for child). In the second approach
(which is the one adopted in Kronenfeld’s 2009 book, Fanti
Kinship and the Analysis of Kinship Terminologies), “wofa,
the Fanti maternal uncle term, would be a1fom, and its re-
ciprocal mof-a” (Kronenfeld 2015:164). The symbols used
here are explained as follows: “m is a male person of either
sex . . . , while 1 is a child to parent link and o a sibling link.”
In addition to these two major approaches, Kronenfeld
mentions a third approach (the NSM approach), of which he
seems rather sceptical:
Another, third, kind of approach, offered by Wierzbicka
(1992, chs 9, 10), uses culture-specific supposedly folk-
based definitions of kin terms constructed out of what she
sees as universal semantic primes (i.e., universally basic
concepts). Her presentation is too brief and minimal for the
reader to see how it might apply to the kind of termino-
logical problems and issues addressed in this chapter; on the
face of her presentation of it there would seem to exist
serious logical problems with any such application. (161)
Kronenfeld does not explain what the supposed logical
problems hinted at in the last sentence above are, but in any case
I believe that the analysis presented in the present paper can
provide answers to his doubts. Since there is no room for fuller
discussion here, let me simply show how the meaning of Kro-
nenfeld’s key examples—the Fanti terms wofa and awofasi—
could be explained through NSM:
someone’s wofa
a man, this someone can say about this man “this is
my wofa”
someone can say this about a man if it is like this:
this man’s mother is the mother of this someone’s
mother
thisman’s father is the father of this someone’smother
a man’s awofasi
someone, this man can say about this someone “this is
my awofasi”
a man can say this about someone if this man is this
someone’s wofa
In Kronenfeld’s 2009 book Fanti Kinship and the Analysis
of Kinship Terminologies (40), the core meanings of the two
words in question, wofa and awofasi, are provided with En-
glish glosses ‘maternal uncle’ and ‘male’s nibling’, and their
core (“kernel”) meanings are given as “a1fom” and “mof-a.”
I submit that the two NSM explications given above have a
greater explanatory power and a stronger claim to psycho-
logical reality and that, at the same time, they are no less rig-
orous than artificial formulas such as “a1fom” and “mof-a,”
and they too constitute formal representations of meaning.
As discussed by Enfield (2002), NSM, too, is a formal se-
mantic metalanguage, even though its formulas are anchored
in natural languages and can be understood via natural lan-
guage. To quote:This content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aNSM researchers prioritise the expressibility of their formal
metalanguage via natural language because it is always
through (our own) natural language that the ultimate in-
terpretation of formal semantic description is made. Thus,
formal semantic metalanguages which are expressed in highly
abstract terms . . . are so obscure at face value as to be opaque
to the untrained observer. For the initiate or expert, these
technical formulas may be interpretable, but nevertheless
only interpretable to the extent that they continue to be
privately paraphrased into natural language. Without prin-
ciples explicitly mapping these formulas onto natural lan-
guage, these other more abstract formal approaches are in-
herently indeterminate. The greater formal precision implied
by their mathematical style is an illusion—because the ab-
stract is ultimately interpreted in terms of the more imme-
diate (Fraser 1996). (244)
I see three key differences between the explications of the
Fanti terms presented here and the formalisms offered by
Kronenfeld. First, they are self-explanatory and do not re-
quire tutorials in the use of artificial symbols. Second, they
are built of simple words available in children’s speech and
thus present meanings that are potentially learnable. Third,
they are cross-translatable into the target language (in this
case, Fanti) and can be discussed with native speaker con-
sultants. (For additional examples, see CA1 online supple-
ment A.)
Kronenfeld rejects (with some qualifications) the old
search for “psychological reality” in the semantic analysis of
kin terms as “impossible and meaningless” (2015:160). I hope
the present paper shows that the approach that requires that
the analyses be anchored in cross-translatable words makes
that old goal not only possible and meaningful but practically
achievable.Comments
Felix K. Ameka
African Languages and Cultures, Leiden University Centre for
Linguistics, PO Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
(f.k.ameka@hum.leidenuniv.nl). 15 III 16
‘Child Of ’ Is a Universal Molecule Too
Anna Wierzbicka continues her fight against Eurocentricism
and Anglocentricism in talking about human experiences
across cultures. Here, she proposes what she calls “the ordi-
nary language model” for analyzing kinship terminologies.
She argues that “all kin terms in all languages build on the
concepts ‘mother’ and ‘father’,” which are semantic molecules
“apparently lexicalized in all languages with exactly the same
meaning” (emphasis added). The meaning she proposes is
that of “birth-giver” for “mother” and “begetter” for “father.”
I do not doubt that there are words roughly equivalent to97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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However, I am not sure that they embody “exactly the same
meaning” across languages. In this comment, I reflect on
some challenges that need to be faced.
The first concerns the postulation of the distinct sense
of ‘begetter’, for example, for the ‘father’ words and assign-
ing other uses also as senses. Thus, for Wierzbicka to make
her argument work, she needs to postulate polysemy for
equivalent lexemes for these terms in an Australian language
like Pitjantjarra. She argues that the senses that are universal
and lexicalized cross-linguistically are the foundation of kin-
ship terminologies. One of the arguments for the polysemy
of the Pitjantjarra term is that there are linguistic expressions
for making a distinction between “biological fathers” (i.e.,
begetters) and “biological mothers” on the one hand and so-
called classificatory fathers andmothers on the other. Onemay
question whether the postulation of polysemy does not de-
stroy the conceptual unity of the term that the speakers have.
Moreover, is the opposition between the “biological” and “clas-
sificatory” not an outsider perspective?
Be that as it may, a second issue concerns languages in
which the kin terms for father and mother have general
meanings and are not polysemous. The begetter or birth-
giving component cannot be isolated as a sense, but it is part
and parcel of the general sense of the words. I would argue
that this is the case in many African languages. In these lin-
guacultures, the lexeme for ‘father’ has a vague rather than a
polysemous semantic structure and includes culture-specific
components related to protection and also respect. Take the
word tɔ́ ‘father’ in Ewe (Niger-Congo, West Africa; see Ameka
2012). Pazzi (1980) speaks of some of the responsibilities of the
tɔ́ in terms of “c’est lui qui leur [ples enfants] impose le nom
et ses responsable de leur education et orientation. Le géniteur
[a] la charge de les nourir et de veiller sur eux jusqu’a l’age
adulte” (270).
This word, then, contains apart from the genitor compo-
nent further components that relate to the following:
this someone does not want bad things to happen to the
other person
this someone does good things for the other someone
this someone is above the other person
In the languages cited by Wierzbicka, the father or mother
word is modified to make a distinction between biological
and classificatory. In Ewe and other African languages, it is
not the ‘father’ or ‘mother’ word that is modified; rather, the
point of view of the child is expressed. Thus, in Ewe one can
speak of their own child asnye ŋútɔ wóAll use suaʋaThis c
bject to Unu.me-vi1SG EMPH POSS penis mouth.containing.region-child‘child from my penis’Words similar to the Ewe tɔ́ and its semantics exist in several
African languages. Such meanings have been transferred into
“father” and “mother” in African Englishes, as the entries pro-
posed by Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009:214–215) indicate.ontent downloaded from 130.056.0
niversity of Chicago Press Terms afather. (n.). (AfrE). definition: ‘elder male community
member’, ‘male person of respect’, ‘male leader in a social/
cultural/religious/ethnic/political group’; term of address
mother. (n.). (AfrE). definition: ‘elder female community
member’, ‘female person of respect’; term of address
The term-of-address uses will be accounted for with cul-
tural scripts, but the conceptual content of the words need
more components than just their role in the biological process.
Furthermore, I suggest that ‘child of ’ or ‘offspring’ should
be a kinship semantic molecule. To start with, this word is
cross-translatable in several languages. In fact, its semantics
match across languages better than that of ‘father’. There is
such a word with precisely this meaning in the 2,000 or so
languages of Africa. One reservation about this molecule is
that in English a parent is less likely to refer to his or her 40-
year-old as my child. The gender-specific ‘child of ’ words
“son” and “daughter” are applicable. If the mother-child re-
lationship provides the universal basis for biological kinship
(Foley 1997:134), then ‘child of ’ is a conceptual building
block that should be recognized.
Once ‘child of’ is accepted, the explication of the Fante
(Akan) words for wofa and wofasi can be improved. Two
points of detail here. First, I do not think there is the need for
the component ‘this man’s father is the father of this
someone’s mother’ for someone’s wofa. The critical ingredi-
ent is the mother line. Second, awofasi can be a relation to a
man or a woman. Leaving that aside, I think that there is a
further cultural component for someone’s wofasi, which can
be smoothly handled by a ‘child of ’ molecule:
This man can think about this someone like this:
this someone is my child
NSM provides a tool for representing the insider’s mean-
ings of culture-specific concepts. As semantic molecules are
composed of atoms, it is inevitable that the equivalents of
semanticmolecules across languages do not encode “exactmean-
ings” that are cross-translatable. I question whether ‘father’ is
a cross-translatable semantic molecule. I suggest that ‘child of ’
in the sense of offspring is cross-translatable and is or should
be a good addition to the foundational molecules for kin cat-
egories across cultures.Oren Harman
Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, 1 Oxford
Street, Science Center, Room 371, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138,
USA (oren.harman@gmail.com). 11 II 16
Avoiding Weird Parents
In Thomas Mann’s masterpiece The Magic Mountain, the
protagonist Hans Castorp, in his early twenties and about to
start a shipbuilding career in Hamburg, travels to a sanato-
rium high in the Swiss Alps to visit a cousin suffering from
tuberculosis (Mann 1966). In the crisp mountain air and
serene setting, Castrop is transported away from the duties97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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peatedly, his departure is delayed by bad health: what begins
as a slight fever and minor bronchial infection is soon di-
agnosed by the sanatorium director as symptoms of tuber-
culosis. Castrop is persuaded to stay. Soon, in the rarefied
alpine atmosphere, Thomas Mann’s hero meets a group of
characters who together represent a microcosm of pre–
World War I Europe: there is the “Eastern man,” Mynheer
Peeperkorn, nonintellectual, sensual, mysterious, incoherent,
tyrannical; there is the Jew turned Jesuit, Leo Naphta, who
celebrates religious authority and idolizes death; and there is
the champion of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment
(liberty, reason, science, and progress), the secular humanist
Lodovico Settembrini. Commentators have speculated about
who Mann’s model for Settembrini really was: many claim he
is based on the author’s brother Heinrich, with whom Mann
had a troubled relationship; others suggest the Devil, Meph-
istopheles; still others suggest the medieval humanist Petrarch,
the writer Dante, or the modern Italian politician Giuseppe
Mazzini. Some, however, have suggested that Settembrini is
the little-known German sociologist and cultural philosopher
Franz Karl Müller-Lyer, who is the starting point for the cur-
rent comment’s argument about the Achilles’ heel of social psy-
chology, anthropology, and comparative linguistics.
Müller-Lyer would probably have been forgotten to history
were it not for a simple illusion he devised that continues to
bear his name. In figure 2, look at the first set of lines above:
which seems longer? What Müller-Lyer showed was that
invariably people say that the second line, with its arrowsThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
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three lines are precisely the same length. All humans suc-
cumb to this illusion, he claimed, since all humans, at base,
are the same. This was 1889, and further examples of such
universals—not just in perception but also in social behavior,
decision making, and moral reasoning—were to follow. Up-
dating the Bible and Aristotle, John Lock and David Hume,
the science of an invariant human nature had been born
again in modern times.
Except that Müller-Lyer was wrong. In an oft-cited paper
titled “The Weirdest People in the World?” that appeared in
Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2010, a team of anthro-
pologists led by Joseph Heinrich of the University of British
Columbia posed a serious challenge to modern-day psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, and behavioral economics (Heinrich,
Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). These fields, the authors argued,
pretend to speak for all of humanity, studying human percep-
tion and thought but also emotions such as jealousy, happiness,
anger, generosity, and empathy. The results of such studies are
meant to tell us something about “human nature,” but an in-
credible 96% of the subjects in these studies represent just 12%
of humanity. That is because these 96% come from a very spe-
cific place: Western, educated, industrialized, rich democracies,
or, if you’d like, WEIRD places.
Take a series of experiments that have been conducted in
tens of thousands of introductory psychology classes with
what is called the Ultimatum Game: subjects are given $100
and asked to share it as they like with a perfect stranger. The
person with the cash can give away just as much as he or she
wants—$50, say, $80, $20, or nothing at all. Turns out, the
results show, that people give $48, on average, and on the
receiving end reject offers up to $40. This seems to reflect a
basic human understanding of fairness. If you are an edu-
cated twenty-first-century American, that is.
Indeed, an American undergraduate is 4,000 times more
likely to be a subject in a psychology experiment than a ran-
dom person outside the West. Four thousand times! And if
that were not enough, 67% of American subjects and 80% of
international subjects are undergraduate psychology students.
That’s a selection bias if ever there was one. What does this
mean for the results of all such research? Consider the Ma-
chiguenga people of the Peruvian Amazon. When Heinrich
and his team presented the members of this small tribe with
the Ultimatum Game in the mid-1990s, they found that the
Indians considered the notion of giving close to half of their
money away downright ridiculous—and rejecting an insult-
ingly low offer even weirder. Machiguenga sensibilities were
actually much closer to those of modern-day Western econ-
omists: after all, rejecting any amount of free money is irra-
tional. Settembrini would have been stumped.
In test after test, WEIRD people and all the rest diverge in
their reactions. Very few people in the West would dream of
penalizing markedly altruistic people who cooperate and give
selflessly, whereas in Inuit cultures such altruists are often
punished. Westerners tend to group objects based on re-
semblance (notebook, magazine, and newspaper go together),Figure 2. Müller-Lyer illusion. A color version of this figure is
available online.97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
6. That it can be shown, for example, that semantic primes exist in all
languages is, I believe, necessary though not sufficient proof of their
innate nature. More difficult is providing a satisfying biological expla-
nation of such representational innateness.
424 Current Anthropology Volume 57, Number 4, August 2016whereas the Chinese group by function (putting a notebook
with a pencil, for instance). And, uniquely, privileged West-
erners tend to describe themselves by their personal char-
acteristics (“I’m hardworking, fun-loving, smart, and have
a great sense of humor”), whereas all the rest tend to do so
by their roll in society (“I am a doctor working in the Min-
istry of Health,” “I am a farmer growing cocoa beans,” “I
am a member of the untouchable caste”). In fact, when all is
said and done, WEIRD people really do seem to be the ex-
ception rather than the rule. “The fact that WEIRD people
are the outliers in so many key domains of the behavioral
sciences render them—perhaps—one of the worst subpop-
ulations one could study for generalizing aboutHomo sapiens,”
the authors conclude (Heinrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010:
38).
Which brings us back to the Müller-Lyer test. Even though
most of the readers of Current Anthropology will tend to
think that the second line is about 20% longer than the first
and that the third is skewed to the right, it turns out that a
number of hunter-gatherer peoples—14 that have been stud-
ied to date, to be exact—suffer from no such illusion. Foragers
in the Kalahari desert, for example, will immediately tell you,
“all three are exactly the same!” And, of course, they are right.
Trying to universalize human experience is tricky, both
when everything is working normally (behavioral economics)
and when things are breaking down (mental health). As
writer Ethan Watters shows in his book Crazy Like Us: The
Globalization of the American Psyche (2011), America is not
only exporting McDonalds, iPhones, and T-shirts, but it is
also straitjacketing mental diagnosis. This can be dangerous.
Non-WEIRD cultures have long practiced their own myriad
ways of thinking about treating anxiety, depression, and ill-
ness, many of which do not necessarily conform to the Amer-
ican Psychological Association’s prescriptions. Inappropriate
diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder in posttsumani Sri
Lanka, for example, has undermined local healing practices by
prescribing unproven drugs at the expense of age-old palliative
wisdom. Western guidelines for treating depression in Japan,
anorexia in Hong Kong, and schizophrenia in Zanzibar are
further troublesome examples. “We should worry about the
loss of diversity in the world’s differing conceptions of treat-
ments for mental illness,” Watters writes, “in the same way we
worry about the loss of biodiversity in nature.”
Seventy percent of all journal citations in psychology come
from studies conducted in the United States, compared with
37% in chemistry. This statistic is cause for worry, since
psychology varies across cultures but chemistry does not.
Many studies of the psychology of shame, to take but one
example, contrast this emotion with guilt. But research con-
ducted by the UCLA anthropologist Daniel Fessler in Beng-
kulu, Indonesia, shows that local people possess different
emotional lexicons; unlike Americans, Indonesians under-
stand shame and guilt not in terms of moral and personal
worth but more strongly in terms of respect and fear, facets
that concern subordinance in a social hierarchy rather thanThis content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aany personal failure to conform to social norms (Fessler 2004).
Even when it comes to ostensibly “neutral” perception, we
discover just how much culture really does matter: that a
Kalahari man and you should see Müller-Lyer’s lines differ-
ently, one hypothesis goes, has to do with the fact that bush-
men have been less exposed to carpentered corners and city-
scapes.
It may be true, however, that there are human universals,
or near universals. Scholars of different stripes and schools
argue bitterly about what they might be, citing among other
things incest avoidance, territoriality, fear of death, rituals,
childcare, pretend play, mourning, etiquette, humor, envy,
social structure, art, music, and aesthetics. One of the most
contested universals has been kinship, a fundamental cate-
gory for ordering human social life. So muddled is this field
of inquiry, David Schneider argued in 1984, so utterly infused
with Eurocentric bias that it should be abandoned altogether
(Schneider 1984). All the more reason why we should wel-
come “Back to ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’: Overcoming the Eu-
rocentrism of Kinship Studies through Eight Lexical Uni-
versals” by Anna Wierzbicka.
Like Watters, Wierzbicka is well aware of the problem of
misunderstanding the world by mistranslating it; her book
Imprisoned in English: The Hazards of English as a Default
Language (2014) makes the case beautifully. One possible
reaction is to give up entirely on the possibility of under-
standing other cultures and languages. To the contrary,
Wierzbicka has devoted her career as a linguist to showing
how it might be possible to achieve a universal, culture-
independent understanding of humans, not least to overcome
a parochial, often unwitting Anglocentrism. Central to her life
calling has been the natural semantic metalanguage frame-
work, or NSM.
I do not know whether Wierzbicka is correct that there
exists a Leibnizian alphabetum cogitationum humanarum;
whether, like atoms in the physical world, a small number of
irreducible concepts inhabit our cognitions, born innately in
the brain and providing the building blocks for all humans
can imagine. It is a fascinating assertion, to be taken seri-
ously, but elusive.6 The beauty of her framework, however, is
that it need not be ontologically proven to be of value in
furthering our understanding of language and culture; its
usefulness, in other words, is independent of its truth. Fun-
damental and unique to NSM is the principle that one should
say something about another culture only with words that
could be used by that same culture. Whether one believes in
innate semantic primes, it is difficult not to see how such a
principle may help rid cultural translations of cultural biases.
Ultimately, the claim advanced here that—as opposed to ‘son’,97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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and ‘father’ are lexical universals, or near universals, must be
judged by its instrumental effectiveness in rendering both the
cross-cultural comparison of kinship terminologies and the
likely “cognitive operations” of language users more trans-
parent.7
Whatever the list of universals we might agree upon may
be, the lesson is clear: American college students, most of
them in psychology departments, should not stand in for
“people” and “humanity,” nor should anthropologists assume
that the language and psychological reality of other cultures is
translatable into their own without a rigorous method (al-
though not an abstract or arcane one). As anyone with a
pulse (or otherwise following the recent Republican and Dem-
ocratic primary debates in America) will surely know, the
grouping of allWesterners together into aWEIRD prototype is
itself an unsustainable and deeply flawed generalization. This
is a blind spot missed by Heinrich, presumably in his enthu-
siasm to make that very point. The team of anthropologists
from British Columbia nevertheless recommend that journal
editors, grant-giving agencies, and universities force psychol-
ogists and behavioral economists to defend their generaliza-
tions, create incentives for conducting studies outside WEIRD
countries, and collaborate internationally. This is good advice,
and Wierzbicka’s linguistic study is an exemplar.
When all is said and done, we need to try to avoid weird
parents. That WEIRD people should look like outliers when
viewed against the rest of the 88% of humanity may not
necessarily be due to the fact that they are any stranger than
all the rest. There is nothing unique about uniqueness, even if
all humans view their own group as remarkable. There’s a
generalization for you. And one, it seems, that ThomasMann’s
hero, Hans Castorp, suffered from like the rest of us. After
seven years of convalescence in the sanatorium and despite
the universalism preached to him by Settembrini, the terrible
trumpets of war resounded throughout Europe. Setting out to
fight for his Germany—to the great apprehension of his mother
and father, no doubt—Castrop was never heard of again.Ian Keen
School of Archaeology and Anthropology, College of Arts and
Social Sciences, Australian National University, Acton, Canberra,
Australian Capital Territory 2601, Australia (ian.keen@anu.edu.au).
6 II 16
The semantic domain of kinship affords a significant test case
for NSM analysis. I agree with Wierzbicka that kinship is
grounded in beliefs about reproductive roles, although she
neglects the widespread presence of other bases of kinship,7. My own view is that NSM-based translation is stronger at ex-
plaining the meaning of words to others than at answering the question
of what is happening when one understands the meaning of a word.
This content downloaded from 130.056.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms asuch as the practice of feeding and bringing up a child and of
food sharing (e.g., Strathern 1973; Sahlins 2012:6). She also
neglects the implications for kinship of new reproductive
technologies (Carsten 2004; Strathern 2011).
The attempted reduction of the meaning of kin terms to a
couple of semantic molecules and a larger number of se-
mantic primes neglects what is probably the universal struc-
ture of sense relations among kin terms within systems of kin
classification, namely, their relative product structure (e.g.,
Burling 1965; Keen 1985, 2014; Kronenfeld 1980; Read 2007;
Wallace and Atkins 1960). Dousset (2008:267) provides an ex-
ample of how a speaker of Ngaanyatjarra (a Western Desert
dialect close to Pitjantjatjara) explicated one of the senses of
ngunytju, ‘mother/mother’s sister’ (example1).Note the relative-
product structure of this gloss in contrast with Wierzbicka’s
NSM gloss of related Pitjantjatjara concepts. This Ngaanyat-
jarra explication seemsmore relevant toNgaanyatjarra concepts
than one expressed in NSMese.(1)97.058
nd Conngunytju on Septem
ditions (httngunytju-ku kurtu
‘mother’ ‘mother’s sister’Indeed, NSM analysis is ill equipped to explicate any but
first-order kin terms satisfactorily because, even with the
addition of “semantic molecules,” the method is incapable of
matching the hierarchical and cumulative structure of relative
product definitions, in which more distant kin are defined in
terms of closer kin. In English kinship, for example, one’s
aunt is commonly defined as the sister of one’s father or
mother or the wife of one’s uncle, one’s first cousin as a child of
one’s uncle or aunt, and first cousin once removed as a child of
one’s first cousin or one’s father’s or mother’s first cousin. (The
exact phrasing varies, of course.) Here, aunt and uncle are
third-order terms, defined as the products of the first-order
terms mother and father and the second-order terms sister
and brother; first cousin is a fourth-order term; and first
cousin once removed is a fifth-order kin term (see Keen 1985).
It is hard to imagine a convincing NSM analyses of higher-
order categories such as mumalkur (MMMBD) and ngathi-
walkur (MMMBS) in Yolngu dialects (northern Australia;
e.g., Keen 1982). Yolngu define these as the ga:thu (mC/BC)
of waku (MMM/MMMZ/MMMB), the galay (MBC) of ma:ri
(MM/MMZ/MMB) or the ma:ri of galay, the mukul (MMBD,
WM) and maralkur (MMBS, WMB) of nga:ndi (M/MZ), and
so on. These kin categories could in principle be reduced to
the semantic molecules ‘mother’, ‘father’, and ‘child’, but the
results would be difficult for a hearer to parse and would
certainly not capture Yolngu discourse.
Relative product definitions of kin are not simply analytical
constructs; there is ample evidence that speakers of many
languages produce them in both spontaneous and elicited
discourses. Keen (2014:24–26) adduces examples from Fanti,
Arrernte, Ngaanyatjarra, Yir Yoront, Japanese, Hindi, and
American and Canadian English, several of which are repro-
duced here (examples 2–10).ber 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
p://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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(Fanti; Kronenfeld 1973)(3) wofa n’ba ba
uncle’s child child (skewing definition)
(Fanti; Kronenfeld 1973)(4) Atyenge anherr-areye is ampe atyenge altyete-kenhe mape
IsgDAT HM/ZSW-pl is ZC 1sgDAT mXC-POSS group
‘My anherr are my female cross-cousin’s children’
(Arrernte; Green 1998:22)(5) kurntili-ku yurntalpa/katja watjirra
‘father’s sisters child’ ‘cross-cousin’
(Ngaanyatjarra; Dousset 2008:267)(6) pam-kewrr-mart pa manhrr athla am mrr
brother’s daughter m out o /Wother f W
‘the niece (mD, wBD) of my mother’ ‘wife’
(Yir Yoront; Alpher 1991:174, 588)(7) pam-mar-walqyamn athlam ngorvm pam-koponvmvrr
nephew out of my wDC/ZDC
‘from my nephew’ ‘grandchild’
(‘nephew’s sister’s
child’)(Yir Yoront; Alpher 1991:195)(8) I: What is an uncle?
S: An uncle is your mother or father’s brother. Or a brother-in-
law (female 22;2.4)
(Canadian English; Benson and Anglin 1987:49, 53)(9) Q. What’s a grandmother?
A. Somebody who’s your mother’s mother.
(Haviland and Clark 1974:38)(10) What does kaku mean?
vədlančya bhavači baiko (FBW)
(‘father’s brother’s wife’)
Will you be a mavsi [MZ]? How?
bahininčya mulanči mavsi
(‘I will be my sister’s child’s mavsi’) (Maharashtra Brahmin
girl of 9 years 6 months)(Hindi; Carter 1984:193)While they do not exhaust the “meanings” of kin terms
(which also have connotative meanings, for example), defini-
tions of primary kin categories in terms of reproductive roles,
marriage, and adoption, as well as relative product definitions
of higher-order kin terms, are constitutive of kinship termi-
nologies. People map kin-relational categories onto networks
of persons by applying such definitions, which determine the
distribution of categories relative to the propositus. Cognitive
models of the resulting kin networks (e.g., Conklin 1969 [1964];
Dousset 2003;Goodwin 2000;Keen 1978:105), which often have
spatial aspects and can be represented visually in several media
(Dousset 2003; Enfield 2005), mediate themapping of kin terms
onto persons (Keen 2014:28).
For Wierzbicka, the explication of kin terms seems to be
primarily a matter of translation. Anthropologists, however,056.0
rms aalso engage in description, analysis, and explanation. Exten-
sion rule analysis, for example, is in effect a description of
aspects of the form of a kin terminology, mapping categories
onto a genealogical grid and pointing to equivalences and
differences among them (e.g., Scheffler 1978). Even though
there are indeed good grounds for rejecting a componential
analysis as a semantic representation, analysis in terms of
equations remains a useful descriptive and comparative tool
(e.g., McConvell 2013b:197).
Kinship abbreviations and symbols are essential analytical
tools, and anthropologists are well aware of their limitations
as well as their strengths. The replacement of kintype symbols
such as FZD on a kinship diagram with lengthy texts in
NSMese would render scanning such a diagram for signifi-
cant patterns all but impossible. Wierzbicka herself uses such
approximations, for example, in her gloss of the Pitjantjatjara
term kamuru as ‘mother’s brother’. “Horses for courses,” to
quote a British proverb, which is to say, use the appropriate
tools for the job.Reply
I am very grateful to the three commentators for engaging
with my article. The main goal of the article was to expose the
Anglocentrism and Eurocentrism rampant in the field of kin-
ship studieswhile at the same time showing how these ills can be
overcome by a return to ‘mother’ and ‘father’ as fundamental
analytical tools and how NSM techniques can be helpful here.
Two of the three commentaries, Felix Ameka’s and Oren
Harman’s, support my contention that Anglocentrism and
Eurocentrism in kinship studies (and in cross-cultural studies
in general) are obstacles to human understanding and ap-
plaud my striving to overcome these biases. By contrast, the
third commentator, Ian Keen, defends what I see as Anglo-
centrism and Eurocentrism in kinship studies; this charge
seems to have touched a raw nerve, so given the very limited
space at my disposal it is on his commentary that I will
concentrate.
According to Keen, “kinship abbreviations and symbols
are essential analytical tools. . . . The replacement of kintype
symbols such as “FZD” on a kinship diagram with lengthy
texts in NSMese would render scanning such a diagram for
significant patterns all but impossible.” This statement high-
lights what I see as the central issue: is a symbol like “FZD”
(for “father’s sister’s daughter”) Anglocentric or is it not? If
this symbol is meant to portray the meaning of a kin term in a
language that does not have words like “sister” and “daughter,”
then it seems obvious that this portrayal is indeed Anglocen-
tric: clearly, this is not how the speakers of that language think.
Ah, but such a portrayal is so concise, so convenient . . .
and it allows us to draw diagrams that can be quickly scanned
for significant patterns . . . “we” being, of course, Anglophone97.058 on September 21, 2016 21:51:14 PM
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(e.g., “sister,” “daughter”) for granted.
Well, I agree: if our main goal is to draw diagrams that can
be quickly scanned for patterns by ourselves and other An-
glophone scholars (thanks to our shared English-based sym-
bols), then yes, symbols like “FZD” may serve us better than
more extended definitions relying on the globally cross-
translatable words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ (as well as ‘woman’,
‘man’, ‘born’, etc.)
When all is said and done, if someone wants to analyze
kinship terminologies through English concepts and does not
mind the Anglocentrism of such an approach, it is their
choice. What I object to, however, is the appropriation of the
term “cognitive” for such pursuits. Defending his analysis of
the words mumalkur and ngathiwalkur in the Australian
language Yolngu as “MMMBD” and “MMMBS,” Keen speaks
of “cognitive models of the resulting networks.” Whose
cognition, though, is being portrayed in such “cognitive
models”? Presumably, not that of Yolngu speakers, to whom
symbols like “D” and “S” cannot mean anything, given that
they stand for the English words “daughter” and “son,” which
have no counterparts in Yolngu.8
Keen criticizes the NSM approach to kinship studies for
paying too much attention to issues of translation: “For
Wierzbicka, the explication of kin terms seems to be pri-
marily a matter of translation. Anthropologists, however, also
engage in description, analysis, and explanation.” It is true
that for me and other NSM researchers the issue of transla-
tion is fundamental. For example, if Keen’s formula “moth-
er’s mother’s mother’s brother’s daughter” (“MMMBD”)
cannot be translated into Yolngu, then no matter how much
sophisticated description, analysis, and explanation formu-
lated in English can be added to that “MMMBD,” from a
cognitive point of view that whole English-based edifice is
built on sand.
In other words, we have to choose: either English-based
conciseness and analytical convenience or genuine cognitive
models of how the speakers think. We can’t always have both.
Keen finds it “hard to imagine a convincing NSM analysis
of higher-order categories such as mumalkur (MMMBD) and
ngathiwalkur (MMMBS).” If by convincing he means as short
and familiar-looking (to anthropologists) as “MMMBD” and
“MMMBS,” then I agree, he will not find NSM analyses of
such kin terms convincing.98. In their seminal paper “Semantic Relationships in Papago Folk-
Definitions,” Joseph Casagrande and Kenneth Hale (1967) pointed out
that “every language must . . . in some degree serve as its own metalan-
guage to explicate semantic usage” (165). I see this as a fundamental
challenge for kinship studies: to explicate a language’s kin terms in
formulas that could have vernacular counterparts (word for word).
9. In emotion studies, a multidisciplinary Human Affectome Project
was recently launched (International Society for Research into Emotions
List, February 15, 2016), a project that aims at identifying the full range
of human emotions through English emotion terms. The reliance on
This content downloaded from 130.056.0
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favored by Keen allows us to capture significant patterns
while the NSM framework does not. Significant patterns
come to light through NSM too (and they could be enhanced
by graphic aids such as underlining, color, labels, etc.). NSM
explications are not just strings of text; they are highly
structured and can reveal patterns that are both authentic
and elegant. In fact, an anonymous reviewer of the “Back to
‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ ” paper volunteered the opinion that
the NSM-based explications of “sibling terms” in Kayardild
given in that paper were more elegant than Evans’ diagrams
framed in English-based symbols like “EZ” (“elder sister”)
and “YB” (“younger brother”). Yes, NSM explications are less
concise than the symbols of kinship algebra, but as discussed
in the paper, the assumption that conciseness should be
regarded as one of the highest values in scholarly analysis is
also Anglocentric.
Ultimately, it is a matter of our goals and priorities. Keen
ends his piece with the British proverb “horses for courses,”
which is to say, he explains, “use the appropriate tools for the
job.” If the “job” (or the goal) is to engage in intellectual
pursuits open only to speakers of English (and insiders of
what Oren Harman calls, with reference to Heinrich, Heine,
and Norenzayan [2010], “WEIRD cultures”), then analytical
tools like “D” (“daughter”) and “S” (“son”) may be appropri-
ate “tools for the job.” If, however, we want to understand how
speakers of languages like Yolngu construe and understand
their social world, then they will not be appropriate. This is in
stark contrast to “mother” and “father,” which, in their pri-
mary sense, are shared by the inhabitants of both WEIRD and
non-WEIRD parts of the world.
According to Felix Ameka, there is a third concept (in
addition to ‘mother’ and ‘father’) that is also shared by a great
many languages of the world: “child of.” The figure of 2,000
languages (in Africa) cited by Ameka is indeed impressive.
But of course there are about 6,000 languages in the world. In
Australia, many languages do not have a word for ‘child of ’.
For example, in Yolngu, the word for a man’s child is gatu
and that for a woman’s child is waku; in Warlpiri, the two
words are ngalabi and gudụ; in Nyulnyul, they are wal and
bap (cf. Scheffler 1978).
In the ocean of Anglocentrism in which we often seem to
be drowning, to see what looks like a little bit of Afrocentrism
is refreshing. Still, the vocation of anthropology is to be not
Anglocentric, not Afrocentric, and not Australocentric, but—
as far as possible—anthropocentric. As I have tried to show
in my “Back to ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ ” paper, the set of uni-
versal or near-universal human concepts posited by NSM
semantics allows us to change our basic orientation from
‘Anglo’ to ‘anthropo’.English terms in the study of both human kinship and human emotions
(in both cases seen as the only “manageable” approach) is understand-
able, but surely such an approach is also counterproductive and pro-
foundly limiting.
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428 Current Anthropology Volume 57, Number 4, August 2016In closing, I will quote, gratefully, a remark made in his
commentary by Oren Harman:
I do not know whetherWierzbicka is correct that there exists
a Leibnizian alphabetum cogitationum humanarum. . . . The
beauty of her framework, however, is that it need not be
ontologically proven to be of value in furthering our un-
derstanding of language and culture. . . . Fundamental and
unique to NSM is the principle that one should say some-
thing about another culture only with words that could be
used by that same culture. Whether one believes in innate
semantic primes, it is difficult not to see how such a principle
may help rid cultural translations of cultural biases.
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